A new service model has emerged which delivers application software and services over the Web on a lease or subscription basis. Our paper studies the optimal licensing policy of a software vendor that uses that business model. We look at software vendors that are both selling (at a posted price) or leasing their products where as lessor they guarantee that the lessee will always have the latest version of the software on their desktop. We address some of the specific issues of implementing this policy at the packaged software market, including the impact of network externality, negligible marginal production costs, and upgrade compatibility. We show that by properly defining their pricing structure, software vendors can segment the market and realize effective second-degree price discrimination and show how and when software vendors can maximize their profits through the use of this new licensing policy.
INTRODUCTION
The development of information technology, especially the Internet, has unleashed unprecedented levels of process innovation, as well as product innovation, in the software industry. The way software is sold is also changing rapidly. This paper addresses the above issue by studying the optimal licensing policy of a monopolist software vendor who provides packaged off-the-shelf products-selling or leasing his products exclusively, or adopting a mixed strategy of both sales and leases.
We show that by charging different prices, the monopolist software vendor can segment the consumers based on their sensitivity to product quality and realize second-price discrimination of the consumers through their self-selection behavior.
Software "quality" includes such dimensions as speed, compatibility with available operating systems, functionalities, user interface, ease of learning, warranty, service and support and other characteristics that affect the users' valuation of the product.
It may be the "perceived quality," which includes both real improvement and a successful marketing component. Potential buyers can assess the quality of existing software, yet the quality of the next version is uncertain. Users who choose early on the lease option with periodic upgrades are exposed to the risk of buying into future upgrades with unknown quality. On the other hand, users who just purchase the software can decide on buying an upgrade after the quality of the new version has been realized.
Software can be used for a period of time without replacement, though its value may depreciate. In this sense, it is a kind of a durable good. Yet software as a commodity has some special characteristics that differentiate it from other durable goods: (i), it is hard to resell or appropriate because of intellectual property rights. There is no other source of a license but the original vendor, the retailers, or service providers. A second-hand market like that for used cars therefore does not exist for software; (ii), with the development of information technology, it is easy to improve the value of already installed software through upgrades without interfering with the original customization; (iii), the production of software which is an information good has cost side economy of scale-it is costly to create the first copy but has negligible marginal production cost for the rest copies. (iv), the use of software has a strong network externality [Katz and Shapiro 1986] . As a result, selling and leasing software have some common features with selling and leasing other durable goods and some special characteristics, too.
Many researchers in such academic fields as economics and marketing have studied durable goods. Coase (1972) conjectured that leasing could be more profitable than selling, because the current sale of the monopolist would cannibalize his future salethe time-inconsistent problem. Bulow (1982) and Gul et al. (1986) have rigorously verified his conjecture. Bucovetsky and Chilton (1986) , however, propose threat of entry as a reason for the monopolist to mix selling and leasing. Desai and Purohit (1998) find that leasing does not dominate selling in all cases if the depreciation of the durable goods is taken into account, and that a mixed strategy is optimal when the depreciation rates differ between selling and leasing. Yet, based on the above analysis, it is unclear whether we can apply marketing theory about selling and leasing durable goods to the distribution strategy of packaged software. Choudhary et al. (1998) 
MODEL
We model the inter-temporal consumer behavior and the firm' s strategic licensing policy with a simple two-period model. We introduce our model by first detailing the assumptions about the players-consumers and the monopoly software vendor (the ISV).
Assume that the consumers of the software product have the following form of net utility:
where p and q are the price paid and the quality of the software product, respectively; x represents the population of the adopters of the product; and θ and e are the intensity of the quality preference and the network externality, respectively. Consumers are heterogeneous in their quality preference θ but are homogeneous in their sensitivity to network externality e. The ISV sets the selling price p 1 , the upgrade price p u , the secondperiod selling price p 2 for the new version, and the per period rent p r at the beginning of period 1. In the lease contract, the vendor is committed to keep the rent, p r , the same during the two periods.
Since the software vendor would like to attract the users to purchase in the first period and can not tell whether a buyer in the second period owns the first version, he can not charge an upgrade price p u higher than the sale price of version II, p 2 ; that is, 
Figure 1: Consumer Strategies
The value for a consumer buying in the first period is
The total value for the buyer in (2) is given by the sum of the net utility for the users in period 1, as defined in (1 After entering a lease contract, the lessee receives continuous streams of product with updates for a fixed annual payment. The value for entering the lease contract in the first period is
This value is the sum of her net utility of using the latest version of the software over the two periods. According to the contract, she has to pay the rent p r every period during the lease 1 .
Finally, the expected discounted value for a consumer inactive in the first period is
If a consumer cannot get a positive net utility from buying the first version of the software, she will be inactive in the first period. She will wait to buy the second version of the software in period 2 if her utility of buying q 2 would be higher than the sale price p 2 .
For a consumer with quality preference θ, the expected total discounted value from using the software over the two periods is
We focus our attention on the consumers' buy-or-lease decision with uncertainty regarding the quality of the next version of the software. To avoid addressing the cannibalization of the two products, we ignore the option of buying version II for the consumers who were inactive in period 1. This assumption is valid under an equilibrium in which the second-period sale price cannot be low enough to allow the early adopter to take advantage by pretending to be a new customer in period 2, or in which the quality of the new generation software only has a minor improvement from the previous version. Based on this restriction, the consumers are deprived of the option of jumping into the new version software without using the first version of the product; that is, V I is fixed at 0.
PURE STRATEGY
In this section, we analyze the pure selling or leasing strategy of the ISV and compare the effects on market competitiveness and consumer surplus. We first look at the case in which the software 1 Assume the penalty is large enough that breaching the contract is not optimal. 
Pure selling
The ISV announces the sale price for the first version of the software, p 1 , and the upgrade price, p u , that rational consumers in period 1 should expect to pay to get version II in the next period.
At the beginning of period 1, consumers make the decision whether to buy version I. In period 2, those users who have bought version I can choose to upgrade to version II at a cost of p u or to keep using version I. The consumers have four possible choices:
(1) Buy version I in period 1 and upgrade to version II in period 2
-(BU). The total expected discounted value over the two periods is 
Figure 2. Market Segmentation in the Pure Selling Market
Let consumer θ 0 be the marginal consumer who is indifferent to being inactive and the BH strategy. Then the value of θ 0 can be solved from
The cutoff values θ HC and θ CU can be obtained by equating the values to which the consumer is indifferent; that is,
Taking into account the consumers' self-selection behavior, the ISV sets prices p 1 and p u to maximize his discounted total profit over the two periods: 
Pure leasing
With the emergence of Internet technologies, software can be delivered through the Web, so leasing becomes a selling option for the software vendor. Suppose that the ISV offers a take-it-orleave-it lease contract over two periods. If a user takes it, she will pay rent p r at the beginning of each period and enjoy the latest version of the software without any additional charge.
The expected discounted value for a consumer who takes the lease is given in (3). Consumers with θ ≥ θ L will get positive utility from the contract.
Given the consumers' choice, the ISV sets the optimal rent in the lease contract to maximize his discounted total profit from the two-period contract:
. . greatly value high quality, so they would always prefer using the latest version of the software product. These consumers can avoid paying the option value embedded in the purchasing method of using software by giving up the option of staying at the status quo.
Their expected value from leasing is higher than that from purchasing and upgrading, so they all lease.
(2) When θ ∈ [θ HC , θ CL ), the consumers act contingently in the second period after they buy the software in period 1; that is, they
upgrade if the quality of the second version is q 2 H , and otherwise they will hold to the old version. Their expected value can be expressed the same as that for V BC (θ) in the pure selling model (Equation (7)).
(3) When θ ∈ [θ 0 , θ HC ), the consumers do not care as much about the quality of the software as those in the BC and L segments, so they will not upgrade if they buy in the first period. Their expected value can be expressed the same as that for V BH (θ) in the pure selling model (Equation (8)).
(4) For consumers with θ ∈ [0, θ 0 ), the utilities of using the software are negative. They would be inactive in the market for both periods. (1 )
This value is zero when the uncertainty disappears:
Without quality uncertainty
When there is no uncertainty about the next generation software, that is, q 2 = q 2 H = q 2 L , there will be only three possible choices for consumers under the hybrid licensing policy. They can decide to buy and upgrade (BU), buy and hold (BH), or be inactive over the two periods. 
Comparison with pure selling and leasing
With the existence of uncertainty about the quality of version II of the software, we compare the market structure and the ISV' s profit among the three selling strategies: pure selling, pure leasing, and concurrent selling and leasing.
First, we compare the pure selling model with the hybrid model.
We have the following conclusions from our stylized model. The intuition behind this is as follows: because the quality preference is private information for each consumer, the ISV must trade off a higher market share (attracting more low quality preference consumers locked in by the leasing contract) with a higher profit margin (extracting more value from the high quality preference consumers). The optimal strategy for the ISV depends on the relative quality level of the different versions of software, the discount rate, and the intensity of the network externality effect. 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Software is different from conventional durable goods because of the low marginal production cost, network externality in its distribution, easy to upgrade and strict Intellectual Property protection. Thus, the Coase Conjecture discussed in the durable goods literature does not apply to the software distribution strategy. Our paper fills in this gap by developing a model combining vertical differentiation and intertemporal price discrimination. Using the model, we find a market segmentation strategy for a software vendor to classify consumers by their quality preferences through different selling strategies. In the presence of quality uncertainty, the vendor finds it optimal to set different prices and selling methods, catering to the different preferences of the consumers with regard to quality. The monopolist vendor gets the same market share under both the pure selling and the hybrid licensing policies. Yet with the hybrid licensing policy, the vendor can better segment the market and price discriminate the consumers by reducing the number of consumers acting contingently. This paper provides insight into software vending: when there exists heterogeneity of quality preferences among consumers and uncertainty with regard to product innovations and upgrades, it is optimal to adopt the hybrid rather than the perpetual or pure leasing licensing policy.
There are some limitations in this paper. In order to discuss the selling and leasing of software products in a simple and insightful model, we ignore some of the minor issues, which will not affect the results very much. For example, we rule out the case that consumers wait until the second period when the quality of the product is high and the network externality for the product is strong enough to use the software. The backward incompatibility assumption in our model underscores the network externality of the new version of the software product. All those assumptions reduce the applicability of the paper. But on the other hand, we gain from the assumptions a relatively simple closed form solution. We will certainly address those questions and test our results in the further research.
